Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 5 Issue 5 - October 2001

Article 3

10-2001

Threading the Needle: Resolving the Impasse Between Equal
Protection and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
Lindsay R. Errickson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Election Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lindsay R. Errickson, Threading the Needle: Resolving the Impasse Between Equal Protection and Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 2057 (2001)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol54/iss5/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

NOTES
Threading the Needle: Resolving
the Impasse Between Equal
Protection and Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION: A GEORGIA BULLDOG CHASES ITS TAIL:
ONE STATE'S DISTRICTING DILEMMA ............................... 2058
RETROGRESSION SESSION: BACKSLIDING, PRECLEARANCE,
AND SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT .................... 2061

A.
B.
C.
III.

Beer v. United States ...........................................
2062
Abrams v. Johnson ...............................................
2064
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board .................... 2066

STAYIN' ALIVE ON 1-85: SHAW, MILLER, AND OTHER RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING BLUNDERS ......................................... 2070

A.
B.
C.
IV.

Shaw v. Reno ........................................................ 2071
M iller v. Johnson ..................................................
2074
Lawyer v. Department of Justice .......................... 2078
WALKING A TIGHTROPE: RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EQUAL PROTECTION AND NON-RETROGRESSION .... 2081

A.
B.

V.

Review of the Conflict ........................................... 2081
Three Solutions to the Conflict ................
2086
1.
Option 1: Redefine the Retrogression
Baseline .....................................................
2087
2.
Option 2: Eliminate the Non-retrogression
Principle ....................................................
2090
3.
Option 3: Use Proportionality As the Nonretrogression Baseline ............................... 2092
CONCLUSION ...................................................................
2096

2057

2058

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:2057

I. INTRODUCTION: A GEORGIA BULLDOG CHASES ITS TAIL:
ONE STATE'S DISTRICTING DILEMMA

When it comes to legislative reapportionment, the Peach
State is in a pickle. Consider this: the results of the 1990 census
entitled Georgia to an additional representative in the United
States Congress, bringing the state's total number of seats to
eleven.' In order to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the
"Voting Rights Act"), 2 the state's legislative district map was redrawn three times during the 1990s before the legal battle over
redistricting finally ground to a halt in 1997. 3 Barely giving the
state's General Assembly and the federal courts a chance to catch
their collective breath, the 2000 census revealed that Georgia's
population had again increased-this time enough for two additional congressional seats. 4 Many of the questions raised by the redistricting litigation of the 1990s have not been answered, including
the problems presented by the non-retrogression principle of the
5
Voting Rights Act.
States such as Georgia, which are subject to U.S. Department of Justice preclearance for their redistricting plans,6 are faced
with a dizzying dilemma. On the one hand, refusal to draw majority-minority districts 7 provides states with near-certain assurance
that the Justice Department will find them in violation of section 5
of the Voting Rights Act, and thus, refuse preclearance. On the

1.

Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50

STAN. L. REV. 731, 748 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, The FireNext Time].

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
3. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 79-82 (1997).
4. Census 2000 Results, Maps of Resident Population and Apportionment,
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/map03bw.pdf (last modified Dec. 28, 2000).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The non-retrogression principle precludes states from enacting any
new voting plan that would place minorities in a position where their capacity to elect the candidate of their choice is diminished vis-A-vis the state's current voting plan. Id.
6. Id. States subject to the preclearance requirements of section 5 of the, Voting Rights Act
are obligated to seek Justice Department approval before implementing any voting plan different
from that in effect in the state before November 1, 1964, November 1, 1968, or November 1, 1972.
Id. Such states have the option of seeking a declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia in lieu of Justice Department approval. Id.
7. Majority-minority districts are those in which the majority of the voters are members of
a race that constitutes a minority of the state's overall voting population. See Pamela S. Karlan,
Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUIMB. L. REV. 287, 289
(1996) (remarking that states will face challenges under the Voting Rights Act if they do not
draw majority-minority districts).
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other hand, drafting a plan that includes one or more majorityminority districts exposes states to lawsuits by majority white voters on the basis that such districts violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 States' high-wire balancing
act has become even more shaky in light of certain Supreme Court
language and the language of the Voting Rights Act, which indicates that preclearance will not necessarily insulate a state from an
equal protection claim.9
In a nutshell, the problem that a state faces in redrawing its
congressional districts is this: in order to avoid suits alleging equal
protection violations, the state must prove that race was not a predominant factor in sketching district boundaries.' 0 For a state to
overcome the preclearance hurdle, however, it has to prove that its
new plan complies with the section 5 non-retrogression principle,
which almost always requires race-conscious districting.
The states' dilemma is caused by two overlapping concerns.
The first problem is the way in which the Court has failed to precisely define "race-conscious districting." 1 The cases brought after
the 1990 census largely involved racial gerrymandering of congressional districts.12 Generally, the Court has held that the drawing of
racially gerrymandered districts violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. 13 Throughout the 1990s, the Court made
clear that a district's irregular shape may play a role in determining whether the district was drawn by impermissibly using race as

8. Id. (noting that if states draw majority-black districts, they face lawsuits under the
Equal Protection Clause).
9.

42 U.S.C. § 1973c (stating that "[n]either an affirmative indication by the Attorney Gen-

eral that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory
judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure"); see also Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 335-36 (2000).

10. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 909-10 (1995).
11. See, e.g., id. at 920 (discussing whether drawing a district based on communities of
common interest reflects a "wholly legitimate purpose," though such an action may be "raceconscious").
12.

See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (199G); Miller, 515 U.S. 900; Shaw v. Reno, 509

U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw I). Racial gerrymandering occurs when the state legislature draws an
election district composed of a majority of minority voters without respect for traditional districting principles such as geographic contiguity or respect for traditional political subdivisions. See
Bush, 517 U.S. at 958-65; Miller, 515 U.S. at 910-16; Shaw 1. 509 U.S. at 64,149.
13. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 927-28. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment states, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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the dominant factor. 14 Yet, the Court has not clearly articulated
what constitutes an irregular shape. Moreover, it is unclear if a
threshold showing of irregularity is necessary, or simply sufficient,
to sustain an equal protection claim. 15 A plaintiff alleging an equal
protection violation because of racial gerrymandering will have
great difficulty in proving that race was impermissibly used as a
factor in congressional reapportionment if irregular shape is not
16
sufficient to sustain such a claim.
The second problem is the non-retrogression principle, which
has a murky history in the legal system. 1 The non-retrogression
principle requires that a state's proposed congressional reapportionment plan not give minority voters less opportunity to elect the
candidate of their choice than the state's current plan. In other
words, a new plan may not dilute the voting power of minority voters. This haziness around the non-retrogression principle exists
primarily because the Supreme Court has yet to define clearly how
to measure whether a minority group is going to suffer more severe
vote dilution under a proposed districting plan. What is clear is
that non-retrogression presents serious problems for both white
voters concerned about equal protection violations and minority
voters worried about the discriminatory effect of new districting
plans.18 White majority voters lament that non-retrogression forces
states to ensure that any new congressional district is composed of
a majority of minority voters. Minority voters are likewise dissatisfied with the non-retrogression principle because it does not necessarily deny preclearance to a districting plan with a discriminatory
purpose as long as the plan is not retrogressive.' 9
Part II of this Note will examine the evolution of the Voting
Rights Act's non-retrogression principle. Part III will investigate
the effect of the legislative reapportionment cases concerning equal
protection issues heard before the Supreme Court following the
1990 census. By dissecting the interaction between equal protection
and non-retrogression, Part IV will observe how that relationship
creates a districting conundrum for jurisdictions subject to the Voting Rights Act's preclearance requirements. Finally, Part IV will

14.
15.
16.
17.
concept
18.
19.

See Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 646-47.
See Karlan, supra note 7, at 288.
See id. at 301-05.
See generallyBush, 517 U.S. 952: Miller, 515 U.S. 900; Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630 (discussing
of racial gerrymandering).
Karlan, supra note 7, at 310.
See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 339 (2000).
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propose three solutions capable of solving a state's district-drawing

migraine.
II. RETROGRESSION SESSION: BACKSLIDING,
PRECLEARANCE, AND SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

The Voting Rights Act imposed sweeping changes on the
ability of many Southern states to create their own legislative apportionment plans. The Voting Rights Act prevented states from
limiting a citizen's right to vote because of race or color.20 Such an
abridgement of the franchise occurred if any individual experienced
a diminished opportunity to elect the representative of his choice
compared to other individuals in the same jurisdiction. 21 In particular, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act had far-reaching consequences. This section prohibited any jurisdiction that met the criteria enumerated in section 4 of the Voting Rights Act from enforcing
a new voting apportionment plan without first seeking preclearance. 22 Preclearance is the process whereby jurisdictions submit
proposed voting plan changes to the U.S. Attorney General for approval. 23 The Justice Department either grants or denies preclearance based on whether the new plan meets section 5's nonretrogression mandate. 24 If the Justice Department denies preclearance, the state may petition the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia for approval of the voting plan.2 A proposed

20.

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).

21. Id.
22.

42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The preclearance requirement applies to any jurisdiction that the

U.S. Attorney General determines maintained a test or device designed to present a prerequisite
to voting on November 1, 1964. Id. In addition, the Director of the Census must determine that
less than fifty percent of the voting age population residing in the jurisdiction in question was
registered to vote on November 1, 1964 or that less than fifty percent of the jurisdiction's population voted in the presidential election held in November, 1964. Id. The act was later amended to
mandate the same requirements as of November 1, 1968 and as of November 1, 1972. 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(b) (1994). Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act also covers jurisdictions that provided English-only voter registration or election materials, contained a registered voting-age population of
less than fifty percent, and contained a single language minority group greater than five percent
of its total population. "Reaffirmation or Requiem for the Voting Rights Act? The Court Will

Decide," A Public Policy Alert from the American Civil Liberties Union (May 1995). at
http:J/wvw.aclu.org/issues/racialfracevote.html4act (last visited Feb. 18, 2001). Jurisdictions
covered by the preclearance requirement include the entire states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Id. Certain counties and
towns within California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming are also
subject to preclearance. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Id.
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plan is non-retrogressive as long as it does not diminish the chances
for minority voters to elect the candidate of their choice in relation
to the current voting apportionment plan. 26 Section 5 was designed
to prevent state legislatures from enacting a continuous stream of
an
discriminatory voting plans without giving minority plaintiffs
27
system.
legal
the
through
plans
those
opportunity to challenge
A. Beer v. United States
The Court first explained the non-retrogression doctrine in
Beer v. United States, a decade after the passage of the Voting
Rights Act. 28 After the 1960 census, the city of New Orleans was
divided into five council districts, one of which had a majority-black
population. 29 The 1970 census revealed population changes that
prompted the city council to redraw the council districts. 30 The
council created a scheme in which two of the districts were majority-minority, one of which contained a majority of black registered
voters.3 1 When the Attorney General denied preclearance, New Orleans sought a declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia stating that the plan did not abridge
the right to vote on account of color.3 2 The district court agreed with
the Attorney General and refused to grant the declaratory judgment. 33 The minority plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.3 4

26. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 324 (2000).
27. See infra note 179.
28. 425 U.S. 130, 131-34 (1975) (explaining that change in districting plan cannot abridge
voting rights on basis of race or color).
29. Id. at 135. Although one district had a majority-black population, the majority of voters
in the district were not black. Id. This apportionment plan resulted in the election of no black
candidates to the city council from 1960 to 1970. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id at 136. This plan was adopted as a substitute when the original plan failed to achieve
Justice Department preclearance. Id. The first plan had also called for the creation of two majority-minority districts, but neither of these districts contained a majority of registered black voters. Id. at 135. The Attorney General refused to grant approval, noting that it seemed to "dilute
black voting strength by combining a number of black voters with a larger number of white voters in each of the five districts." Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The district court reasoned that "iflNegroes could elect city councilmen in proportion
to their share of the city's registered voters, they would be able to choose 2.42 of the city's seven
councilmen, and, if in proportion to their share of the city's population, to choose 3.15 councilmen." Id. The court noted that under the second plan, minority voters would only be able to elect
one councilman because only one district contained a majority of registered black voters and city
council elections were inevitably decided along strictly racial lines. Id.
34. Id. at 138.
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The Supreme Court began its analysis by determining that
whether or not the right to vote had been abridged on account of
color was directly related to Congress's intent in drafting section 5
of the Voting Rights Act. 35 That intent was to "insure that the gains
thus far achieved in minority political participation [should] not be
destroyed through new discriminatory procedures and techniques." 36 In other words, the Justice Department was charged with
prohibiting any change in legislative apportionment until the authors of the redistricting legislation could prove that the change
was not discriminatory. 37 In 1975 Congress clarified the standard
under which section 5 voting discrimination was to be measured,
when it stated: 38 "[T]he standard (under Section 5) can only be fully
satisfied by determining . . . whether the ability of minority
groups... to elect their choices to office is augmented, diminished,
or not affected by the change affecting voting."39 The Court made it
explicitly clear that it understood "non-retrogression" to mean that
a court could not accept any voting plan changes that would result
in the backsliding of minority voting opportunities. 40 At the very
least, this understanding of non-retrogression effectively mandated
the maintenance of the same number of majority-minority districts
as had existed under the previous plan.
The Court then addressed the merits of the second proposed
districting plan. The Court held that New Orleans' second plan did
not violate section 5 because implementation of that plan gave
every reason to hope that at least one minority candidate would be
elected. 41 By comparison, under the 1960 plan, there were no majority-black registered voter districts, and therefore, little hope of
electing a minority-preferred candidate. 4 2 Thus, the standard articulated in Beer indicated that retrogression would be measured
against the baseline of the last legally enacted voting plan. 43 In affirming the new plan as an "ameliorative new legislative apportionment,"44 however, the Court noted that the redrafted plan could

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 139.
S. REP. No. 94-295, at 19 (1964).
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976).
Id. at 141.
H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 60 (1964).
Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
Id. at 142.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 141.
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still violate section 5 if it "so discriminates on the basis of race or
45
color as to violate the Constitution."
B. Abrams v. Johnson
More than twenty years later, the Court further muddied the
waters of the non-retrogression principle in litigation stemming
from Georgia's epic redistricting struggle following the 1990 census.
The unworkable nature of the non-retrogression requirement is
most clearly understood in light of the Abrams v. Johnson decision. 46 Black voters in Abrams challenged the constitutionality of a
congressional apportionment plan drawn by the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia, which contained only one majority-minority district. 47 The appellants contended that the creation of only one such district was a violation of section 5 of the Vot48
ing Rights Act.

The most significant problem in complying with the nonretrogression principle is discerning which baseline should be used
when measuring the effects of a new districting plan. 49 The Court
faced several choices for determining how to judge a proposal for
new congressional districts. The appellants in Abrams argued that
the baseline should be either the plan initially drawn by the legislature after the 1990 census, or the first plan precleared by the Justice Department. 50 The Court declined to use either one of these
plans as the starting point for a normative determination of
whether the plan drawn by the district court was non-

45. Id.
46. 521 U.S. 74, 79-85 (1997) (highlighting Georgia's difficulty in drawing districting plan
that qualified for preclearance and also followed traditional districting principles).
47. Id. at 78. Abrarns was a continuation of the redistricting litigation first encountered in
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). The Supreme Court held in Miller that Georgia's Elov.
enth Congressional District was unconstitutional because the legislature had used race as a
predominant factor in drawing district lines. 515 U.S. at 921. On remand, the district court
asked the state legislature to draft a new plan, but the legislature was unable to work out a
compromise. Abranis, 521 U.S. at 77-78. The district court then took matters into its own hands
and drew a plan containing only one majority-black district. Id. at 78.
48. Abranms, 521 U.S. at 74.
49. See Karlan, supra note 1, at 747-48. The "baseline" is whichever plan against which the
court determines the proposed plan should be measured to judge whether the new plan satisfies
non-retrogression. See id. at 742.
50. Abrarns, 521 U.S. at 96. The first plan drawn after the 1990 census, proposed by the
General Assembly in 1991, called for two majority-black districts, but failed to garner preclearance support from the Justice Department. Id. A second plan, precleared in 1992, also planned
two majority-minority districts, but was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional
because race was used as a predominant factor in drawing the Eleventh Congressional District.
Id. at 97.
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retrogressive. 5 1 Instead, the Court determined that the district
court had identified the proper benchmark in pointing to the 1982
plan that had been in effect for more than a decade. 52 Under the
1982 redistricting plan, approved by the state legislature, only one
of the state's ten districts was majority black. 53 The Court chose the
1982 plan as the baseline because the Justice Department's preclearance regulations state that a plan's degree of retrogression is
measured by comparing a new plan to the one in force at the time
the proposed plan is submitted. 54 The Court maintained that an existing plan cannot serve as the baseline measurement if it was not
enacted before the deadline for coverage to become effective or does
not meet the requirements of section 5.55 Because the two previous
plans proposed after the 1990 census were either unconstitutional
or never legally enacted, the last legally enforceable plan was the
one drawn after the 1980 census, the 1982 plan.
Despite the Court's finding that the 1982 plan was the baseline from which to measure retrogression, the appellants still maintained that the district court's redrawn plan resulted in a reduction
of minority voting strength. 56 They based this argument on the fact
that every time Georgia gained another congressional seat, the percentage of minority districts in relation to the total number of districts would decrease unless the new seat was established in a majority-minority district. 57 The Court rejected this reasoning because
of the untenable results it would produce. Under such a rationale, if
a state with at least one majority-minority district experienced
population growth that resulted in the addition of congressional
seats, the state's new voting plan would have to draw those new
districts as majority-minority. 58 The Court held that the Voting

51. Id. The Court noted that it was highly illogical to use either plan as a benchmark because neither plan was in effect at the time of the appeal. Id.
52. Id. at 97.
53. Id.
54. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b)(1) (1996).
55. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 97. By holding that the last legally enacted plan was the baseline
by which proposed plans were to be measured for possible retrogression violations, the Supreme
Court was effectively saying that previously proposed plans, even if in compliance with section 5,
could not be used as the non-retrogression benchmark. Plans previously proposed, but never
enacted, fell short of serving as the non-retrogression baseline measurement not because they
violated section 5, but because the Court had determined that they violated equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Karlan, supra note 1, at 749 (CAs a purely formal matter, Georgia's black
voters were quantitatively worse off under the district court's plan than they had been in 1982.
Their share of the state's overall population had increased ...and yet the fraction of the state's
seats that were majority black had gone down.").
58. Abranms, 521 U.S. at 97-98.
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Rights Act could not reasonably be read as mandating that a state
could never again draw a majority-white district simply because it
would result in a reduced percentage of majority-minority districts. 59
The district's minority voters nevertheless contended that
the district court's plan violated the non-retrogression principle,
even using the 1982 voting plan as a starting point for measuring
retrogression. 60 The plan drawn after the 1980 census, which allotted Georgia ten congressional seats, required one of the ten districts to be drawn with a majority-minority voting population.6 1
When the district court substituted its new reapportionment
scheme for the legislature's scheme after the Miller v. Johnson remand, 62 the new plan challenged in Abrams retained only the one
majority-minority district despite the fact that the 1990 census had
63
increased Georgia's congressional representation to eleven seats.
The Supreme Court held that the new plan was constitutional because the Voting Rights Act did not require state legislatures to
designate each new district that a state acquired as majorityminority. 64 Thus, the importance of Abrams is that the Court refused to interpret the non-retrogression principle as mandating
that states continue to draw the same percentage of majorityminority districts after each census.
C. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board
The Court revisited the retrogression principle again in 2000
in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, a case concerning the districting plan for electing school board members in a Louisiana parish. 65 After the 1990 census, the Bossier Parish School Board (the
"Board") redrew its election districts to reflect population shifts.60
Neither the previous plan, adopted after the 1980 census, nor the

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
63. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 78. While this did not constitute retrogression in absolute terms, it
did decrease the percentage of minority districts relative to the rest of the state's majority-white
districts. Id. Under the 1980 plan, ten percent of the state's districts had a majority-black voting
population, but under the 1990 plan, only nine percent could claim majority-black citizenship. Id.
64. Id. at 97-98.
65. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
66. Id. at 324.
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proposed plan, contained any majority-minority districts. When
the Board applied for preclearance in 1993, the Justice Department
rejected the newly drawn scheme, noting that there were enough
black voters concentrated in geographically contiguous areas to enable the Board to draw two majority-minority districts.6 8 After having been thwarted by the Justice Department, the Board filed the
same plan for preclearance with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.6 9

Black voters contesting the Board's plan were precluded
from asserting the same argument as those defending Georgia's redistricting plan in Abrams 70 because Bossier Parish's plan did not
result in the retrogression of minority voting influence. 7 1 The
Board's new plan simply maintained the status quo in that there
were no majority-minority districts under the plan enacted under
the 1980 census, and none were added in the plan created after the
1990 census. 72 Consequently, the appellants contended that even
though they could not prove traditional retrogression under the
Beer standard, the new plan nonetheless violated section 5 of the

Voting Rights Act because it was drawn with a "discriminatory
purpose."

73

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's opinion on

another ground, 74 but remanded to the district court the question of
"whether the § 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search
for retrogressive intent."7 5 The district court avoided addressing the

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The Voting Rights Act permits jurisdictions seeking voting plan preclearance to either petition the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment
stating that the proposed plan is non-retrogressive or to seek approval from the U.S. Attorney
General 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). The Attorney General has sixty days from the date the plan is
submitted to interpose an objection, or the jurisdiction seeking preclearance may implement its
proposed plan. Id.
70. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 97 (1997). Black voters in Abranis maintained that
the reduction in the percentage of majority-minority districts in relation to the overall number of
congressional districts constituted a violation of the non-retrogression principle, an argument
that the Supreme Court rejected as beyond the scope of section 5. Id. at 97-98.
71. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320. 324 (2000).
72. Id. at 323-24.
73. Id. at 325. The district court disagreed, holding that the Board had sufficiently proven
that the new plan had two valid non-discriminatory purposes: to gain Justice Department preclearance, and to implement quickly a new plan that did not require a complete overhaul of district lines. Id.
74. Id. The Court held that an otherwise valid districting plan could not be denied preclearance simply because it violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which bars discriminatory
voting practices. Id. A suit for preclearance is to be denied only if the plan violates the nonretrogression principle. Id.
75. Id. at 325-26.
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issue of whether retrogression also encompasses an examination of
discriminatory purpose.7 6 The Justice Department appealed the district court's holding as clearly erroneous on the grounds that there
was no evidence of a discriminatory but non-retrogressive pur-

pose. 77 They also contended that the Voting Rights Act did not allow
the Justice Department to issue preclearance of a discriminatory
voting plan, even if it was non-retrogressive.7 8 The Supreme Court
held that as a matter of statutory construction the purpose prong of
section 5 only covered retrogressive purpose and not discriminatory
purpose. 79 Concluding that the section 5 purpose inquiry does not
extend to looking for a discriminatory purpose, but only looks to
retrogressive intent, the Court stated that, "in vote-dilution cases, §
5 prevents nothing but backsliding, and preclearance under § 5 affirms nothing but the absence of backsliding." 80
Finding that the new plan should receive section 5 preclearance, the Court seemed to ignore the language in Beer stating that
a districting plan violates section 5 if "the new apportionment itself
so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Con-

stitution.'

In Bossier Parish School Board, the Court limited its

holding to a finding that preclearance does not indicate that the
new plan will survive any constitutional challenge. 82 According to
the Bossier Parish School Board Court, section 5 preclearance

76. Id. at 326. The district court declined to address the question because they claimed that
"the record will not support a conclusion that extends beyond the presence or absence of retrogressive intent." Id. (quoting Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 7 F. Supp. 2d 29, 31 (D.D.C. 1998).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 328. The court noted that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act states that jurisdic.
tions seeking preclearance have to prove that (1) the plan "does not have the purpose.., of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color," and (2) the plan "will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on the account of race or color." Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1973c). The appellants argued that when Congress wrote the statute prohibiting a plan
"abridging the right to vote on account of race or color' that they intended to ban retrogressive
effects and discriminatorypurpose. Id at 329. Appellants also cited Richmond v. United States,
422 U.S. 358 (1975) as an occasion on which the Court gave "purpose" a broader definition than
"effect." Id. at 330. The Court distinguished that case, however, as one where preclearance was
sought when the city was attempting to expand its borders, a change that resulted in a reduction
in the percentage of black voters within the city. Id. The Court further held that "although the
annexation may have had the effect of creating a political unit with a lower percentage of blacks,
so long as it fairly reflected the strength of the Negro community as it existed after the annexation, it did not violate Section 5." Id. (citing Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371). Limiting its ruling to
cases involving annexation, the Court observed that failure to limit the effect prong would result
in the "invalidation of all annexations of areas with a lower proportion of minority voters than
the annexing unit." Id. (citing Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378-79).
80. Id. at 335.
81. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976).
82. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 335-36 (2000).
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merely signaled the Justice Department's ruling that the new plan
does not result in greater minority vote dilution than the current

voting procedures.83 The holding in Bossier Parish School Board
also seems to contradict the Court's reasoning in Miller, which
holds that "[a]meliorative changes . . . cannot be found to violate
section 5 unless they so discriminate on the basis of race or color as
to violate the Constitution."8 4 In fact, the Miller Court referenced
its earlier decision in PleasantGrove v. United States,8 5 which held
that the state was obligated to prove its proposed plan was nondis-

criminatory under section 5.86 The Miller Court further held that
Georgia had satisfied this burden by asserting that it had rejected
the Justice Department's "max-black" plan in order to adhere to
87
traditional districting principles.
On the issue of discrimination and preclearance, the Court's
reasoning in these cases seems inconsistent because it confuses the
purposes of section 2 and section 5.88 Under the Court's reasoning
of the Voting Rights Act, an "ameliorative" change, like that proposed in Miller or Beer, can be refused preclearance if it unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of race.8 9 A change that merely

83. Id. at 335. The Court noted that any new voting plan, as long as it does not violate nonretrogression "cannot be stopped in advance under the extraordinary burden-shifting procedures
in Section 5, but must be attacked through the normal means ofsection 2 actionf Id.
84. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924 (1995).
85. Miller, 515 U.S. at 923-24 (citing Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 468
(1987)). PleasantGrove involved a petition from an Alabama town to the Attorney General of the
United States seeking preclearance of a new voting plan enacted after the town incorporated an
uninhabited area. Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 464 (1987). The Attorney General refused to issue section 5 preclearance because the town had ignored the request of surrounding areas, heavily populated by black residents, for annexation to the town. Id. at 466.
After the town filed a motion for declaratory judgment with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court affirmed the Attorney Generars denial of preclearance on
the basis that the town had attempted to engage in future vote dilution by not allowing the areas
populated by black residents to incorporate within the town. Id. at 472.
86. Miller, 515 U.S. at 924.
87. Id. A "max-black" plan draws districts in such a way as to maximize the number of majority-minority districts within the state by connecting geographically scattered black populations. Id. Although the Supreme Court accepted the district court's finding that the state had
successfully articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for their districting plan, Pamela Karlan
noted that Georgia's "traditional" districting practices were "constitutionally obnoxious." as
Georgia had declined to redraw its districts for nearly thirty years after 1931 even though the
state's population continued to shift from rural to urban. Karlan, supra note 1, at 745. For a
comprehensive discussion of Miller, see infra Part IlI.B.
88. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act states: "No voting [practice] shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement
of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color...." 42 U.S.C. §
1973a (1994).
89. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000). Justice Scalia rejected this interpretation by saying that "[a]t the time Beer was decided, it had not been established that
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maintains the status quo, however, like the one proposed in Bossier
ParishSchool Board, does not need to pass constitutional muster in
relation to discrimination.9 0 The Bossier ParishSchool Board Court
held that such a plan cannot dilute minority voting any more than
the one currently in effect. 9 ' In Bossier Parish, the question of
whether or not the plan impermissibly discriminated on the basis of
race was reserved for legal challenges to be brought under section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, not one to be solved on the accelerated
timetable accorded to section 5 preclearance actions. 92 The Court,
however, maintained that this distinction was immaterial because
judicial preclearance did not preclude an attack on the voting plan
because of unconstitutional vote dilution under section 2.93 In summary, the battle in the preceding cases was over section 5 preclearance rather than section 2 vote dilution because section 5 is the
mechanism that prevents costly and fruitless legal challenges to
voting plans enacted by reticent state legislatures. Section 5 protects minority voters from the necessity of bringing suit against the
state for enacting a more discriminatory districting plan than the
one currently in use by blocking the proposed plan from ever taking
effect. By contrast, section 2 provides protection against plans that
94
are objectively, rather than comparatively, discriminatory.
III. STAYIN' ALIVE ON 1-85: SHAW, MILLER, AND OTHER
RACIAL GERRYMANDERING BLUNDERS
The redistricting cases that arose after the 1990 census differed significantly from those encountered by the Court in the
1980s. The majority of cases before the Court in the 1980s concerned suits brought by minority voters alleging that redistricting
plans were unconstitutional because they allowed for minority vote

discriminatory purpose as well as discriminatory effect [were] necessary for a constitutional
violation." Id. at 337 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia continued that "[a] much more plausible
explanation of the statement is that it referred to a constitutional violation other than vote dilution-and, more specifically, a violation consisting of a 'denial' of the right to vote, rather than an
'abridgement.' " Id. at 337-38. He also conceded, however, that the Court had "quoted [this] dictum in subsequent cases" while hastily denying that the Court had ever used it to deny procloarance. Id. at 338.
90. Id. at 339.
91. Id. at 340.
92. Id. at 336.
93. Id. at 338-39. Justice Scalia affirmed that the "fully available remedy [under section 2]
leaves us untroubled by the possibility that [section] 5 could produce preclearance of an unconsti.
tutionally dilutive redistricting plan." Id. at 339.
94. Id. at 333-35.
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dilution in violation of the Voting Rights Act. 95 The cases arising in
the 1990s, however, usually involved claims brought by white voters contending that districts were gerrymandered to produce majority-minority populations, which constituted discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 6
A. Shaw v. Reno
North Carolina was one of the first states confronted with a
suit challenging the constitutionality of race-based congressional
redistricting after the 1990 census.9 7 In Shaw v. Reno, the North
Carolina legislature attempted to redraw the state's congressional
districts as a result of the state receiving an additional congressional seat.9 8 Any plan that the North Carolina General Assembly
drew was subject to pre-approval by the U.S. Attorney General under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.99 The first newly-crafted plan
included one majority-black district out of twelve total districts
statewide. The Justice Department rejected this plan, finding that
it diluted minority voting strength. 10 0 Following preclearance rejection, the Assembly returned to the drawing board to sculpt a second
plan that included two majority-black districts, Districts One and
Twelve, for a state in which blacks composed twenty percent of the

voting-age population. 101 District One was described as follows:
[lit is somewhat hook shaped. Centered in the northeast portion of the state, it
moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southern-most part of the state near the South Carolina border. District 1 has been compared to a "Rorschach ink-blot test"1 and a
"bug splattered on a windshield." 103

95. See, e.g., Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 509-10 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that the reapportionment plan adopted by the Georgia state legislature after the 1980 census violated section 2 because the plan was racially discriminatory).
96. See, eg., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-23 (1995) (finding race-based discrimination that violated Fourteenth Amendment in redistricting plans).
97. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993) (Shaw 1).
98. Id. at 633. The 1990 census revealed that North Carolina was entitled to increase the
state's number of congressional districts from eleven to twelve. Id.
99. Preclearance by the Justice Department or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia is mandatory for certain covered jurisdictions before any change can be made in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" established after November 1, 1964. 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (1994); see also supra note 22 (describing preclearance requirement).
100. Shaw 1,509 U.S. at 633.
101. Id. at 635. Although blacks comprised one-fifth of the state's potential electorate, minority populations were not concentrated in identifiable population centers. Id. at 634. Only five
percent of the State's counties contained a majority of minority citizens. Id.
102. Id. at 635 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1992)).
103. Id. (quoting WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14).
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The second majority-minority subdivision, District Twelve, was a
long, snake-like creation that ran the 160-mile length of Interstate
85 through the state. 10 4 One member of the General Assembly
deadpanned that "if you drove down the interstate with both car
doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." 10 5 This plan
survived Justice Department scrutiny only to be confronted with an
equal protection challenge by white voters in the two gerrymandered districts. 0 6 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina held that the creation of the majority-black First
07
and Twelfth Districts did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The court decided that creation of the two majority-minority districts did not constitute an equal protection violation because the
districts did not have the effect of diluting white voting strength. 108
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs claimed that
the North Carolina redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause because it separated blacks
from whites for the purpose of voting. 10 9 The Court began its analysis of the equal protection claim by noting that a voting plan motivated primarily by racial concerns garnered the same strict scrutiny that the Court applied to any legislation that categorized citizens by race. 1 10 The Court agreed that the General Assembly's plan
to create two majority-minority voting districts was closely related
to the objective of maintaining adequate minority representation.",
The Court rejected, however, the State's assertion that it had a
compelling interest in creating a majority-black district in order to
12
comply with the Voting Rights Act.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 636 (quoting WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A4).

106. Id. at 636-38. The appellants in this case filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina on the grounds that the two majority.minority districts were
an impermissible racial gerrymander, and therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 638-39.
107. Id. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and not the intention to undermine white

voters' electoral representation, was the state's true purpose in creating the two districts in question. See id. at 638.
108. Id. at 638-39.
109. See id. at 642.
110. Id. at 643; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (stating that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect" and are thus subject
to strict scrutiny review). Strict judicial scrutiny of legislation involves the application of a two-

prong test that asks both if the legislation is closely related to its proposed objectives and if the
legislation is narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U'S. 630,
643 (1993) (Shaw 1).
111. Id. at 655.
112. Id. at 654. The Supreme Court maintained that neither of its decisions concerning the
non-retrogression principle under section 5 was intended to give those jurisdictions covered by
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The plaintiffs asserted that the district's strange geographic
shape subverted the race-neutral districting principles in favor of
using race as the sole criterion for redrawing the electoral map. 13
Although the Court observed that state legislatures invariably take
the racial composition of a district into account when drawing district lines, awareness alone of race was not a violation of equal protection.1 1 4 If blacks lived together in one community, the General
Assembly would be entitled to group them together in a single district.1 1 5 Assigning a district to blacks who lived together in a single
community would not constitute an "awareness" of race any more
than would grouping whites of the same community in a single district.11 6 Such an arrangement would conform to traditional districting principles, which include respect for traditional political subdivisions.117
Acknowledging this, however, the Supreme Court held that
geographic irregularity was a sufficient ground upon which to bring
an equal protection claim." 8 Noting that "reapportionment is one
area in which appearances do matter," the Court found that grouping black voters in a district in which the residents had little in
common except for the color of their skin bore "an uncomfortable
resemblance to political apartheid.""19 The bizarre shape of a district provided proof that the districting plan was simply an attempt
to create a district whose identifying characteristic was the race of
its inhabitants.120
The Court's reasoning with regard to the shape of the contested districts foreshadowed the calamity that would befall several
other jurisdictions covered under the section 5 preclearance requirement. 121 Per the Voting Rights Act, after the 1990 census,

the act "carte blancheto engage in racial gerrymandering in the name of non-retrogression." Id.

at 632.
113. Id. at 647. The Court noted that a district's borders will sometimes be so visually bizarre that "it rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 'segregate

voters' on the basis of race." Id. An example of such a highly irregular district would be one in
which a state contoured a district to encompass widely dispersed minority populations. Id. The

strange shape of the district could provide further proof that the state ignored standard districting ideals, such as compactness, contiguity, and traditional political subdivisions (such as counties). Id.
114. Id. at 642.
115. See id. at 647 (noting that such a plan could incorporate traditionally race-neutral dis-

tricting objectives, such as compactness or contiguity of political subdivisions).
116. Id. at 646.
117. See Karlan, supranote 1, at 733.
118. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1993) (Show 1).
119. Id. at 647.
120. Id.
121. See id.
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North Carolina drew a plan containing only one majority-minority
district.122 The Justice Department denied preclearance, forcing the
state legislature to redraft a plan that contained two majorityminority districts.123 Unfortunately, in order to draw those two districts, the legislature was forced to connect black populations in
regions of the state far removed from one another. 124 By taking race
into account in forming Districts One and Twelve, North Carolina
125
then exposed itself to an equal protection claim.
B. Miller v. Johnson
Two years after Shaw, the Supreme Court was again asked
to examine the constitutionality of a congressional district drawn
after the 1990 census, this time in Georgia. 126 Before 1990, Georgia's population was twenty-seven percent black, but only one of the
state's ten congressional districts was majority black. 127 When the
decennial census showed that Georgia was entitled to an additional
district, the General Assembly proceeded to redraw the state's congressional districts. 128 The Georgia State General Assembly, like

that of North Carolina, was subject to Section 5 preclearance by the
U.S. Attorney General. 129 Georgia, like North Carolina in Shaw,
was also confronted with a troubling dilemma due to the Justice

122. Id. at 633.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 635.
125. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina for a determination of whether the reapportionment plan drawn by the
state legislature was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Id. at 658.
The district court held that the voting plan survived strict scrutiny because it served the state's
compelling government interest in complying with section 2 and section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 901-02 (1996) (Shaw II). The plaintiffs again appealed the
district court's ruling. Id. at 902. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that state's plan was not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest because section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act did not mandate the creation of District Twelve, the state's second majority-minority

district. Id. at 918. In order for the state to be in violation of section 2, the legislature would have
had to refuse to draw a majority-minority district in an area in which the minority group was
"geographically compact." Id. at 916. The Supreme Court found that "[n]o one looking at District
[Twelve] could reasonably suggest that the district contains a 'geographically compact' population of any race." Id.
126. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
127. Id. at 906.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 22 (describing the preclearance requirement).
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Department's mandate that any new districting plan could not reduce minority voting strength relative to prior levels. 30
In their attempt to comply with the myriad Justice Department requirements for redistricting, the Assembly drew two majority-minority districts, the Fifth and the Eleventh, as well as a third
district, the Second, where blacks comprised thirty-five percent of
the population.131 The Justice Department rejected this plan, along
with a modified alternative that increased the percentage of blacks
in the three districts. 132 Consequently, the U.S. Attorney General
pressed for the creation of yet a third majority-minority district in
order to enable the state to receive preclearance. 133 The General
Assembly ceded to Justice Department demands and created the
third majority-minority district by redrawing the Second District to
include the heavily black areas surrounding Macon, and retooling
the Eleventh District to encompass the black population in Savan34
nah.1
Congressional elections were held under the new districting
plan in November of 1992, and resulted in the election of black candidates from each of the three majority-minority districts redrawn
after the 1990 census. 3 5 White voters from the Eleventh District
subsequently brought suit against the state, alleging that their district violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it had been racially gerrymandered. 136 The
district court agreed with the plaintiffs and held that the redistricting plan was unconstitutional under Shaw because race was the

130. See Karlan, supra note 1, at 748-49 (noting that this requirement placed states redraw-

ing their districts in an untenable position). If a state such as Georgia, which had one majorityminority district before 1990, received an additional congressional seat, was it obligated to make
the additional district majority black? Before 1990, minority voting strength would have been
one in ten, or ten percent of the State's districts. Id. If Georgia did not designate its new district
as majority-minority, however, minority voting strength would drop to one in eleven, or 9.1%. Id.
The Court did not explain whether this action would constitute reducing minority voting
strength relative to prior levels. Id.
131. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 906 (1995).
132. Id. at 907.
133. Id.
134. Id. This plan, originally proposed by the American Civil Liberties Union, was known as
the "max-black" or 'Macon/Savannah trade." Id. Under this plan, "the black population of Meriwether County was gouged out of the Third District and attached to the Second District by the
narrowest of land bridges; Effingham and Chatham Counties were split to make way for the
Savannah extension, which itself split the City of Savannah" Id. When the dust had settled, "the
plan as a whole split 26 counties, 23 more than the existing congressional districts." Id.
135. Id. at 909.
136. Id.
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overriding factor in drawing the districts. 137 The state appealed on
the grounds that simply showing that race was the motivating factor in redrawing the districts was not enough to sustain a claim under Shaw. 138 In addition, Georgia claimed that, in order to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, the district must be so visually irregular that there could be no rational explanation for its bizarre shape
other than that it was drawn to create a majority-minority district.

39

In Miller v. Johnson, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that the Georgia legislature's districting plan
was unconstitutional. 140 The Miller Court rejected a key element of
the Shaw holding,141 finding that the plaintiffs were not required to
show that the districts were geographically irregular.142 In attempting to clarify its opinion in Shaw, the Court reasoned that a plaintiff alleging an equal protection violation did not need to show that
a district was visually bizarre in order to meet its burden of
proof. 43 While a district's irregular shape could serve as powerful
evidence that the legislature impermissibly used race as the prevailing factor when drafting the reapportionment plan, it was not
required. 144 A geographically bizarre district, therefore, provided a
court with proof that the legislature had subsumed traditional districting principles, such as compactness and contiguity, in favor of
drawing districts based entirely on racial considerations.145
The Miller Court was concerned that forcing plaintiffs to
show a lack of geographical compactness would make proof of unconstitutionality too difficult in cases where a plan might be facially
neutral, but nonetheless enacted with a racial purpose or objective

137. Id. at 910. The district court made this determination on the basis of legislative history

revealing the General Assembly's intent and purpose in creating the reapportionment plan containing three majority-minority districts. Id. The court also cited the district's shape as persuasive evidence that the legislature drew the district's boundaries specifically to include concentrations of minority populations. Id.
138. Id.

139. Id. at 910-11.
140. Id. at 928.

141. The Court applies strict judicial scrutiny when a district "is so extremely irregular on its
face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for the purposes of
voting." Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (Shaw 1).
142. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) ("In sum, we make clear that parties alleging that a State has assigned voters on the basis of race are neither confined in their proof to
evidence regarding the district's geometry and makeup nor required to make a threshold showing of bizarreness").
143. Id. at 913.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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in mind. 146 The Court narrowed the Shaw holding by observing that
the odd shape of the district provided sufficient proof for the plaintiffs' claim of racial gerrymandering, but that evidence other than
147
visual irregularity could be used to support a claim.
Because geographical compactness ceased to be a constitutional requirement after Miller, it became unclear what plaintiffs
alleging an equal protection violation were required to prove in order to compel the Supreme Court to use strict scrutiny in evaluating a districting plan. In Miller, the Court maintained, on the
strength of its previous equal protection decisions, that racial classifications were inherently suspect. 48 Therefore, the plaintiffs
needed to show that race was the primary factor in the Assembly's
149
decision to redraw the congressional districts in such a manner.
To show that race was the Assembly's main concern in choosing the
plan that contained three majority-minority districts, the plaintiffs
would need to prove that the Assembly abandoned other concerns
such as "compactness, contiguity, [and] respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests. . . ."15 The
state admitted that one of these considerations, contiguity, was
shelved in the creation of at least one of the majority-black districts
when it stated that "to the extent that precincts in the Eleventh
Congressional District are split, a substantial reason for their being
split was the objective of increasing the black population of that
district."15' The Court decided that because race was the main consideration in drawing the Eleventh District, the General Assembly's
plan was subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the compelling
52
governmental interest test.

146. Id. (citing to such cases as Gonillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), in which the "redrawing of Tuskegee, Alabama's municipal boundaries left no doubt that the plan was designed
to exclude blacks").
147. Id. at 914. Other types of evidence that could support a claim of racial gerrymandering
are lack of respect for traditional political subdivisions or failure to protect incumbency. See id.
at 916-17.

148. Id. at 915; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995)
(holding that the use of even benign race-based classifications invited the application of strict
judicial scrutiny and the compelling governmental interest test).
149. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
150. Id. (noting that the enumeration of these three criteria was not intended to suggest that
they were the only traditional principles that could have been abandoned in favor of race as a
consideration).
151. Id. at 918.
152. Id. at 920. The Court also gave considerable weight to evidence submitted by the plaintiffs showing that there were no discernable "communities of interest" connecting the far-flung
minority populations of the Eleventh District, and in fact, that the district's black population was
divided by widely differing political, social, and economic goals. Id. at 919-20.

2078

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:2057

For legislation to satisfy the compelling governmental interest test, it must be both closely related to the legislative objective
and narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling governmental interest.' 53 One governmental concern that the Court had previously
found "compelling" was the interest in remedying past discrimination.15 4 The Miller Court, however, noted that Georgia did not claim
that it created the Eleventh District in order to remedy past discrimination. 155 The only reason that the state redrew the Eleventh
District to include the concentrated black populations in Savannah
was to satisfy the Justice Department's preclearance demands. 156
Thus, the Court found that Georgia did not have a compelling interest in adopting the precleared plan, and noted that the Justice
Department's mandate alone did not ensure constitutionality of the
57
districting scheme. 1
C. Lawyer v. Department of Justice
After the Shaw and Miller opinions, the Court's application
of the strict scrutiny standard seemed to portend that gerrymandered majority-minority districts could not withstand an equal protection challenge. However, the Court belied that trend in a 1997
Florida case concerning state legislative redistricting. 5 8 Florida
sought to redraw its state district boundaries after the 1990 census
showed significant population redistribution in several of its major
urban areas, including Tampa. 159 Five Florida counties, including
Tampa's Hillsborough County, are subject to Justice Department
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act. 16 0 The Justice Department refused to clear the state's initial plan, stating that it separated minority populations in Hillsborough County into different
legislative districts and declined to create a majority-black district
in the county.16 ' In light of the Justice Department's objections, the

153. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
154. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993) (Shaw 1).
155. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995).
156. Id. at 921.
157. Id. at 923. The Court observed that although it often deferred to an agency's legislative
interpretations, the Court had declined to do so when the agency's reading of the statute implicated constitutional issues. Id. "When the Justice Department's interpretation of the Act compels
race-based districting, it by definition raises a serious constitutional question." Id.
158. See Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
159. Id. at 569.
160. Id. at 570; see also supranote 22 (describing the preclearance requirement).
161. Lawyer, 521 U.S. at 570.
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state redrew the districts to create a gerrymandered state senate
district, District Twenty-One, whose population was approximately
forty-six percent black.' 62 The Florida Supreme Court explicitly
noted that the major consideration in the creation of the district
was "racial and ethnic fairness," and that the district %;'as"contorted" in a way that joined blacks who had "little in common besides their race." 163 After elections were held under this plan in
1992 and 1994, several white residents of Hillsborough County
brought suit alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.16
The majority of the plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with the state that redrew the district's boundaries to decrease the percentage of black residents.' 65 Although a U.S. District
Court in Florida found that the new plan did not place primary importance on race in its creation, the Supreme Court held that the
standard of review for the district court's finding was clear error.' 6
In holding that the new plan did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court placed heavy emphasis on the appearance of the new district, noting that it was "demonstrably benign
and satisfactorily tidy."' 67 Although the district was still somewhat
irregularly shaped, as it bridged Tampa Bay and included parts of
three counties, the Court did not find its shape troubling because
many Florida districts had similar characteristics.lt6 In fact, the
Court intimated that the district's irregular shape constituted evidence that the state legislature had not engaged in racial gerrymandering because Florida's unique geography and numerous bodies of water often forced the creation of strangely-shaped districts. 169 Although the Supreme Court had previously held that
plaintiffs are not required to prove that a district is oddly shaped in

162. Id. at 571.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 571-72. Initially, five white residents brought suit against the State, contending
that District Twenty-One violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Four of the plaintiffs reached
a settlement with the State, under which the boundaries of District Twenty-One would he revised in order to shape them in a more traditional fashion. Id. at 572. The new plan also decreased minority voting strength from the forty-six percent under the original plan to approxi-

mately thirty-six percent. Id. at 573.
165. Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 573 (1997).
166. Id. at 580.
167. Id. at 575.
168. Id. at 581. The end-to-end distance of the district was fifty miles, which placed it well
within the range of distances state-wide. Id. at 581 n.8. The Court also noted that the meaning of
the term "traditionally shaped districts" was relative to Florida because the state's geography, as
well as the number of districts in relation to the number of counties, often made for uniquelyshaped districts. Id. at 581 n.9.
169. Id. at 581.

2080

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:2057

order to establish a racial gerrymander, Lawyer represents yet another case in which the Court looked to shape as a determining factor. This is primarily because shape is the most striking indicator of
170
the presence or absence of racial gerrymandering.
In addition, the Court further found the new District
Twenty-One to be constitutional because of the district's racial
composition. 171 The Court upheld the district court's finding that
the district's population shared common economic interests, which
constituted evidence that traditional, race-neutral districting principles dominated the new plan. 172 Additional proof that the new
plan did not use race as its primary factor in deciding district lines
came from the fact that the redrawn District Twenty-One was not
majority-minority. 7 3 The Supreme Court, therefore, upheld the district court's finding that District Twenty-One was constitutionally
drawn because race was not used as the most prominent factor in
174
its drafting.
The Supreme Court's analysis in both Shaw and Miller presents states that are attempting to redistrict under the preclearance requirement with a confusing set of directives. For instance,
the Voting Rights Act requires Georgia to obtain Justice Department preclearance any time it redraws its districts. 1 5 After the
1990 census, Georgia submitted two redistricting plans for preclearance and was twice told that its plans did not satisfy the minority voter non-retrogression principle. After the Justice Department made clear that it would not accept a plan that did not include a third majority-minority district, Georgia's General Assembly had no choice but to manipulate the state's black populations
into irregularly shaped districts. However, the fact that the state

170. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910 (1995) (holding that "race was the overriding
and predominant force in the districting determination" because "several appendages drawn for
the obvious purpose of putting black populations in the district' contributed to its irregular
shape).
171. See Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 582 (1997).
172. See id. District Twenty-One's population consisted primarily of low-income urbanites
and was the poorest of the nine districts in and around Tampa. Id. at 581. The Court noted that
the districts "white and black members alike share a similarly depressed economic condition."
Id.
173. Id. The new District Twenty-One's black voting-age population was 36.2% of the total
electorate. Id. The district court emphasized that the reduction in minority voting strength from
the original plan created a district that could no longer be considered an automatic win for a
minority candidate. Id. The new district "offers to any candidate, without regard to race, the
opportunity to seek and be elected to office." Id. (citing Scott v. Dep't of Justice, 920 F. Supp.
1248, 1256 (M.D. Fla. 1996)).
174. Id. at 582-83.
175. See supra note 22 (describing the preclearance requirement).
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used race as the primary criterion for redrawing the districts left
*Georgia vulnerable to a court challenge by white voters under the
Equal Protection Clause. Georgia was essentially left with no choice
but to adopt the Justice Department's plan and hope that white
voters would not challenge the newly created majority-minority dis176
tricts.
The Lawyer Court further muddied the congressional reapportionment waters by implying that a district irregularly shaped
on its face may nonetheless survive strict scrutiny if the district's
population is not majority-minority, even if the district's percentage
of minority voters is greater than that of the counties that comprise
the district. 177 The major challenge for states facing reapportionment after the 2000 census will be attempting to confront the problem of being subject to both Justice Department and Supreme Court
mandates that are at odds with one another.
IV. WALKING A TIGHTROPE: 178 RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN EQUAL PROTECTION AND NON-RETROGRESSION
A. Review of the Conflict
At one time, the non-retrogression principle was an integral
part of enforcing the Voting Rights Act, which was established to
eliminate racial discrimination in voting. 179 The jurisdictions subject to section 5 preclearance were able to maintain discriminatory
districting practices by staying one step ahead of available law enforcement techniques. Statutes enacted by the state legislatures
remained good law until the Justice Department or an affected
voter brought a lawsuit proving that the legislature's districting
plan discriminated against minority voters.18 0 Congress's purpose in
enacting section 5 was to solidify the past progress made towards
ensuring minority voter participation in the political process' 8 ' and

176. See generally Karlan, supra note 7, at 306-11 (discussing difficulty of satisfying preclearance requirements while at the same time preventing equal protection lawsuits).
177. Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1997).
178. Karlan, supra note 7, at 289.
179. H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 57-58 (1964) ("Section 5 was a response to a common practice

in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down.").
180. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) ("Congress therefore decided, as the Supreme Court held it could, 'to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the

evil to its victim,' by 'freezing election procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be
shown to be nondiscriminatory.' ").
181. Id. at 141.
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to buttress these gains through section 5 preclearance procedures. 182 In requiring new plans to be non-retrogressive, Southern
states' legislatures were discouraged from enacting new discriminathat such plans would never
tory voting plans because they realized
183
survive Justice Department scrutiny.
Non-retrogression was easily defined in the years immediately following passage of the Voting Rights Act. Indeed, virtually
none of the jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirement of
section 5 contained any majority-minority districts.184 For instance,
in Beer, the New Orleans City Council districts drawn after the
1960 census did not include any districts in which blacks constituted a majority of registered voters, and only one in which they
were a majority of the population. 185 After the 1970 census, these
states were compelled to redraw their districts to include at least
one with a majority-black voting population. 186 For these jurisdictions, a non-retrogressive plan consisted of simply not eliminating
the one majority-minority district that was created after 1970.187 In
other words, the baseline of one district was clearly delineated.
As seen in this Note, the non-retrogression principle began
to encounter problems during the period after 1990, the third decennial census after the passage of the Voting Rights Act. As states
gained additional congressional seats, the baseline for retrogression
shifted and became unclear. Georgia, in particular, experienced the
tensions between the principles of non-retrogression and equal protection. 188 After the 1980 census, Georgia had ten congressional districts, one of which was majority-minority. In the decade between
the 1980 and 1990 censuses, Georgia experienced population
growth sufficient for the addition of one congressional seat, forcing
the Georgia General Assembly to draw a new voting plan that
would survive Justice Department scrutiny under the section 5 nonretrogression principle. When white voters in Abrams brought a
claim protesting the districting changes made after the 1990 cen182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., id. at 130.
185. See id. at 135.
186. Because the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965, the period following the 1970 census
represented the first opportunity for many jurisdictions to redraft their legislative apportionment plans to reflect changes in the growth and location of minority populations. See 42 U.S.C. §
1973c (1994).
187. See, e.g., Beer, 425 U.S. at 135-36.
188. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904-907 (1995) (noting that Georgia had ex-

perienced difficulty juggling its districting obligations under both the Equal Protection Clauso
and the non-retrogression principle of Section 5).
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sus, the Supreme Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not
compel states to create a new majority-minority district every time
they gain a new district. 1 9 Because the non-retrogression baseline
is the previous legal voting plan,' 9 Georgia reasonably believed it
could enact a new voting plan as long as it contained the same one
majority-minority district as under the current plan.' 9 ' The Justice
Department refused preclearance, however, and Georgia spent the
rest of the decade grappling with how to resolve the state's conflicting needs of attaining preclearance and avoiding equal protection
92
lawsuits.
One answer to the states' redistricting nightmares is to redefine the non-retrogression principle altogether. The current retrogression standard disadvantages black voters because it allows preclearance of any voting plan that does not dilute black votes more
than the current plan. 193 From a minority perspective, this understanding of retrogression has two main drawbacks. First, it does not
account for the fact that the new plan can be precleared even if it
represents no improvement over representation of minority voting
interests.1 94 This "backsliding" prohibition once made sense given
that the jurisdictions covered by the Voting Rights Act had a tendency to have one discriminatory voting policy waiting in the wings
while their current voting policy was being challenged in the
courts. 95 The Court's recent cases have suggested, however, that
the appropriate baseline for measuring retrogression is the last legally enacted voting plan. 96 In some cases, the "current" or "last
legally enacted" voting plan is more than ten years old and no
longer accurately reflects the racial and geographic composition of
the state. 97 Thus, if the minority population of the state has shifted
or increased, measuring non-retrogression by the last legally enacted plan does not prevent discrimination for a group that may
currently comprise a larger percentage of a state's population.
Second, the Supreme Court's most recent redistricting decision declined to read section 5 as explicitly prohibiting a discriminatory voting plan, but read it instead to require only that the plan
189. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98 (1997).
190. Id. at 97.
191. Id. at 98.
192. See Abrarns, 521 U.S. at 98; Miller, 515 U.S. at 906-08.
193. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 327-28 (2000).
194. Id. at 334-35.
195. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 5758 (1964)).
196. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 97 (1997).
197. See, e.g., id.
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not be retrogressive. 198 Like the preclearance problem, this principle also effectively continues the practice of diluting minority voting
strength. If a discriminatory plan can gain preclearance, section 5
provides no safeguards of voting rights in cases where the last enacted plan contains no majority-minority districts and the proposed
plan also does not create a new majority-minority district. 199 This
scenario places a nearly impossible burden of proof on a minority
plaintiff. 200 The plaintiff will have to prove that the new plan is discriminatory under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which will be
difficult to show given that the last legally enacted plan passed constitutional muster and contains the same number (zero) of majority20 1
minority districts as the proposed plan.
The Court contemplated this sort of future discrimination in
the 1980s. The appellants in Bossier Parish School Board challenged the premise that section 5 permits the Justice Department
to issue preclearance when a plan is discriminatory but nonretrogressive. The appellants claimed that the Pleasant Grove
Court had determined that the purpose prong of section 5 extends
beyond non-retrogression. 20 2 The Court rejected this argument, noting that the facts in PleasantGrove presented the Court with a peculiar situation. 20 3 The city in that case consisted of a nearly exclusively white population, with only thirty-two black citizens, none of
whom were registered to vote. 204 After annexing new land, mostly
vacant or inhabited by whites, the city sought section 5 preclearance for their new districting plan. 205 The Court upheld the district

198. See BossierParishSch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 336, 341.
199. See id. at 334-35.
200. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 156 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In dis-

agreeing with the majority, Justice Marshall asserted that the Court's Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence indicated that "dilution of voting power refers to resulting voting strength that is
something less than potential (i.e., proportional) power, not to a reduction of existing power." Id,
Under Justice Marshall's reasoning, a minority plaintiff could simply assert that the city has not
maximized minority voting potential. But see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 925 (1995) (reject-

ing the Justice Department's assertion that section 5 requires the state legislature to enact a

"max-black" plan, i.e., a plan that would maximize the potential power of minority voters wero
those voters to be consolidated into a single congressional district).
201. In order to sustain a cause of action for violation of section 2 of the voting Rights Act,
the plaintiff must plead and prove the three "Gingles factors": (1) that the minority group is
"sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," (2) that it is "politically cohesive," and (3) that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Karlan, Still Hazy,

supra note 7, at 307 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)).
202. PleasantGrove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987).
203. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 339 (2000).
204. Id. (citing PleasantGrove, 479 U.S. at 465 n.2).
205. Id. at 340.
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court's finding that the city had a discriminatory purpose because
section 5 "looks not only to the present effects of changes, but to
their future effects as well... [and] it is quite plausible to see [the
annexation] as motivated by the impermissible purpose of minimizing future black voting strength. 20 6 Thus, the Court held in Pleasant Grove that a jurisdiction that attempts to dilute potential future minority voting strength through the enactment of a new voting procedure may fail to gain preclearance because of a retrogres20 7
sive purpose.
Not only will black voters have a claim for dilution of future
voting strength, but the states face serious equal protection concerns under the current non-retrogression principle. 23 If the last
legally enacted plan is the benchmark by which to measure section
5 violations, a state faces a unique problem if its minority populations have relocated in a way that decreases the minority population of any of its majority-minority districts to the point where
blacks are no longer a political majority of the voters in that district. For instance, if blacks constituted twenty percent of a state's
population after the 1980 census, the state could have drafted its
voting plan to create two majority-minority districts out of ten total
districts. If the black population drained out of those two majorityminority districts and did not re-concentrate in another location,
the state might feel compelled to draw two new majority-minority
districts elsewhere to ensure Justice Department preclearance. 2 9
But, if the state tried to draw two new majority-minority districts
in a different location, it could face an equal protection challenge
from white voters who suddenly found, themselves in a majorityminority district with little hope of electing a candidate of their
choice. 210 It is at this point that states trying to gain preclearance
would be forced into the impossible situation of trying to defend a

206. Id. (citing PleasantGrove, 479 U.S. at 471-72).
207. Id.
208. The dissent in Miller noted that "[a] history of exclusion from state politics left racial
minorities without clout to extract provisions for fair representation in the lawmaking forum."
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 948 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "The majority, by definition, encounters no such blockage." Id. "Vhite voters in Georgia do not lack means to exert
strong pressure on their state legislators." Id. The white voter placed by the state legislature in a
majority-minority district has the same miniscule opportunity of electing a representative of his
choice as the black voter placed in a majority-white district. While white voters, as a group, do
not face the same struggle for representation, Justice Ginsburg seems to ignore that the essence
of the equal protection doctrine is to insulate individualsfrom discrimination by the state.
209. See, e.g., id. at 907-08 (noting that Georgia was continually frustrated by the Justice
Department's refusal to grant preclearance and its insistence on the creation of a new majorityminority district that linked minority populations hundreds of miles apart).
210. See id.
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district from an equal protection challenge. 2 11 The problem is that
the very factor that makes a districting plan likely to achieve preclearance (successfully preserving minority voting strength) would
also make the plan vulnerable to an equal protection challenge on
the basis that the district was not geographically compact.
The shifting of minority populations is where the problems
with the non-retrogression principle and gerrymandered election
districts intersect. The Supreme Court has held that districts
drawn using race as the predominant factor are unconstitutional
violations of equal protection. 2 12 The Court has likewise noted, however, that it will not subject reapportionment plans to strict scrutiny when states create majority-minority districts, as long as state
legislatures do not use race as the predominant factor or ignore
traditional districting principles when drawing proposed election
plans. 2 13 Yet, in order to obey non-retrogression principles, race
must always be the most important criterion used in drawing election districts. 2 14 In order to avoid backsliding in creating opportunities for minority voters, the state has to draw enough districts with
blacks as a majority of the voting population to ensure that minority votes are not diluted relative to prior levels. 21 5
B. Three Solutions to the Conflict
There are currently three prominent solutions for ending the
stalemate between equal protection concerns and the nonretrogression principle of the Voting Rights Act. This Note undertakes a critique of the first option, as proposed by David Guinn,
Christopher Chapman, and Kathryn Knechtel, of one court's attempt to redefine the non-retrogression baseline. 21 6 Barring redefi-

211. See id.
212. See, e.g., id. at 921.
213. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 993 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
214. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act also bars states from drawing districts in a way that
gives minority voters a diminished capacity to elect the representative of their choice in the way
that white voters are able to do simply because they are the majority. Id. at 993. Section 2 may
therefore require that a state draw a majority-minority district if three factors (known as the
Gingles factors) are present: (1) the minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," (2) "it is politically cohesive," and (3)
"the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate." Id. at 993-94 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)).
215. See Karlan, supra note 1, at 747-49.
216. David M. Guinn et al., Redistricting in 2001 and Beyond: Navigating the Narrow Chan.
nel Between the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 225, 251.
53 (1999).
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nition of the non-retrogression baseline, a second option calls for
the abolition of the non-retrogression requirement for Justice Department preclearance. Lastly, a third option contemplates using
proportionality as a non-retrogression baseline. Each of these options offers certain advantages and drawbacks, but each also offers
a starting point to address the inherent confusion in the current
Court jurisprudence regarding self-contradicting reapportionment
doctrines and the Voting Rights Act and envisions a new solution
for states.
1. Option 1: Redefine the Retrogression Baseline
One method that the courts could use to help states avoid
drawing discriminatory districts is to redefine the retrogression
baseline. The benchmark by which a districting plan is currently
measured for non-retrogression is the last legally enacted voting
plan.2 17 The problem with this baseline is that when states attempt
to redraw districts after the 2000 census, the last legal voting plan
that they will use as a benchmark could be unconstitutional not
because it discriminates against minority voters, but because it violates the Equal Protection Clause. Such plans were not unconstitutional when state legislatures enacted them after the 1990 census,
but seen through the prism of the Supreme Court's decisions in
Miller and Shaw, states may be forced to recognize that they
impermissibly drew plans using race as the predominant factor. 2 8
Redefining the benchmark by which the Justice Department
measures non-retrogression could solve the problem presented by
states that might have an unconstitutionally drawn reapportionment scheme operating as their last legally enacted plan. One pro-

217. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 97 (1997).
218. Guinn et al., supra note 216, at 253. The authors observe that although some states
"may have gone through an entire decade with a benchmark that may have been constitutionally
suspect, by adhering to traditional redistricting principles, if the newv plan does not cause retrogression, the political subdivision will have overcome its old, constitutionally suspect benchmark." Id. Although it is certainly important for a district to adhere to achieving the goals of
both traditional districting principles and the current non.retrogression principle, this argument
fails to solve the problem of balancing constitutional and Voting Rights Act concerns. State legislatures will have great difficulty adhering to traditional districting principles, such as geographic
compactness and contiguity, while at the same time avoiding retrogression of minority voting
opportunities. Because retrogression is measured from the last legally enacted voting plan, and
many such plans drafted after the 1990 census created unconstitutional, impermissibly drawn
majority-minority districts in order to prevent equal protection violations, a state legislature will
almost certainly require a reduction in the number of majority-minority districts, inevitably
causing some reduction in the opportunity for minority voters to elect a candidate of their choice.
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posal has suggested that when the U.S. Attorney General recognizes that a state's current plan is an impermissible racial gerrymander, the Justice Department could use traditional districting
principles as a baseline for deciding whether the new plan results
in diminished opportunities for minority voters. 21 9 This solution
seems unworkable because of the conflict between traditional districting principles and adequate minority voting opportunities.
In the past, traditional districting principles, including geographical compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions, have led states to draw districts in which minorities were not
a majority of a district's population. 220 Most majority-minority districts have sprung from a state legislature's willingness to manipulate or overlook traditional principles and place race above all other
considerations. 221 Therefore, taking traditional principles into account would almost certainly result in a retrogression of minority
voting opportunities, beyond even those properly diminished by
eliminating racially gerrymandered districts. 222 Also, redrafting the
section 5 non-retrogression baseline would force the Justice Department to define what it considers traditional districting principles. Many of the states covered by the section 5 preclearance requirement used apportionment schemes that included traditional
districting principles before Congress passed the Voting Rights

Act. 223

219. Id. at 252. The authors concede that this plan would force the Justice Department to accept an inevitable decline in minority voting strength in districts that were formed on the basis
of an unconstitutional racial gerrymander to begin with. Id. Preclearance proceedings would
therefore recognize a difference between diminished minority voting strength due to the elimination of racially gerrymandered districts, and a decline in minority voting strength because a
state's plan purposefully forced the decline of minority voters' opportunity to elect the candidate
of their choice.
220. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 135 (1976).
221. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644-49 (1993) (Shaw 1) (holding that racially gerrymandered election districts violate the Equal Protection Clause because race was used as the
predominant factor in drawing district lines).
222. But see Guinn et al., supra note 216, at 252 (suggesting that the 2000 census will reveal
that the population growth experienced by many states subject to preclearance will be due to an
increase in minorities as both a percentage and total number of the state's citizenry, and there.
fore, using traditional districting principles will not have the same malevolent impact on minority voting opportunities that such principles had when minorities were a smaller segment of the
population).
223. But see Karlan, supra note 1, at 745 (noting that Georgia's concept of traditional districting principles before Miller was "constitutionally obnoxious"). Before Congress passed the
Voting Rights Act, Georgia's refusal to split traditional political subdivisions, such as counties,
resulted in the disproportionate influence wielded by rural white voters throughout the early
part of the twentieth century. Id.
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A second method of reshaping the non-retrogression baseline
calls for any jurisdiction covered under the preclearance requirement to ask a district court to declare whether that state's districting plan is invalid under Shaw. 224 Following a district court's declaration of invalidity, the Justice Department's benchmark for measuring that state's degree of non-retrogression would then become
the last legally enacted voting plan before the one declared unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 225 This solution seems valid
for states that had a recently enacted legal voting plan, but it creates a potential nightmare for others. Such a solution might force
the Justice Department to look backwards in time nearly twentyfive or thirty years to find a voting plan that did not violate either
the Equal Protection Clause or section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
In most states, a voting plan more than two decades old would bear
little relation to the current population demographics, thereby creating a potential "Catch-22" for state legislatures.
A third practical suggestion for redefining the nonretrogression baseline is to seek judicial preclearance rather than
Justice Department approval. 226 Under this option, states would file
suit for a declaratory judgment granting preclearance in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia. 227 By conceding that its
current districting plan is unconstitutional, the state could then ask
the court to identify the appropriate, most recently enacted election
plan.228 The greatest advantage to this approach is the flexibility
that it allows the court in determining the appropriate benchmark.
For those states that have never enacted a baseline that would be
considered constitutional under Shaw, the court could employ an
alternative benchmark based on a state's particular circumstances. 22 9 With flexibility, however, comes the danger inherent in
increased judicial activism. This scenario would obligate the court
to undertake an intensive study of a state's unique population and

224. Guinn et al., supra note 216, at 252.
225. Id. For this proposition, the authors cite to the Supreme Court's holding in Abrams that

"section 5 cannot be used to freeze in place the very aspects of a plan found unconstitutional." Id.
at 249.
226. Id. at 253.
227. Id.
228. Id. The authors note that this would allow the court to examine the constitutionality of

the benchmark before the state drafts a reapportionment plan, and would prevent the state from
erroneously employing an unconstitutional retrogression baseline. Id.

229. Id. The court would have many options in choosing a baseline for states without a legally enacted benchmark. The foremost advantage of the court choosing the non-retrogression

baseline is that it could take into account a state's ability to draw majority-minority districts
while also respecting geographical compactness.
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racial demographics in order to determine a reasonable nonretrogression baseline, an investigation for which the Justice Department is better suited due to its administrative nature. In addition, when the Justice Department denies preclearance, a state currently has the option of seeking a declaratory judgment from the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 230 Because this
scenario obligates the state to bypass the Justice Department and
seek preclearance from the court, the state legislature would have
no recourse if the court proposed a plan that the legislature found
unworkable.
Both the courts and the jurisdictions subject to section 5 preclearance requirements would encounter serious hurdles in the application of all three of these proposals for altering the retrogression baseline. The major obstacle in implementing these suggestions, and what makes them eventually unworkable, is their reliance on the courts for either finding or creating a retrogression
baseline for each state that concedes its current plan violates the
Equal Protection Clause. The Justice Department is better able to
handle the challenges of finding a suitable retrogression baseline
because of its expertise in dealing with each individual state's historical voting practices.
2. Option 2: Eliminate the Non-Retrogression Principle
Yet another option to help states draw constitutionally acceptable districts is to eliminate the non-retrogression principle.
The non-retrogression principle could be eliminated as a requirement for preclearance from the U.S. Attorney General because it is
inconsistent with the equal protection principles embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 231 Equal protection demands that legisla232
tive districts cannot be drawn with race as the dominant factor,
and if they are, such districts will be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 233 Surviving strict scrutiny requires that the state prove the

230. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).

231. The Miller Court held that the Justice Department's interpretation of section 5 requiring states to maximize the number of majority-minority districts wherever possible was not
supported by the language or legislative history of the statute. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
925 (1995). Because there was "no indication Congress intended such a far-reaching application
of section 5," the Court declined to address "the constitutional problems that interpretation
raises." Id. at 927.
232. Id. at 925.
233. To subject a state's plan to strict scrutiny, a plaintiff claiming an equal protection violation must assert that "the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and
traditional districting practices." Id. at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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way in which its districts were drawn was narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest.234 Because the Supreme
Court has rejected compliance with the non-retrogression principle
of section 5 as a compelling governmental interest, the states are

left with virtually no way for their plans to survive strict scrutiny. 235 The Court, however, would not accept compliance with the

Justice Department's directives for complying with section 5 because these Justice Department mandates raised serious equal pro-

tection questions. 236 The Court's constitutional role prohibits it from
deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute such as Section
2 7
5 when that interpretation raises a serious constitutional issue. 3
Also, the Supreme Court's ruling in Bossier Parish School
Board severely diminished the stated purpose of section 5.M Be-

cause the Court held that the Justice Department was obligated to
preclear even discriminatory apportionment schemes as long as
they were non-retrogressive, minority plaintiffs no longer have the
advantage of preventing a state from simply replacing one discriminatory plan with another. 239 Next, because state legislatures
have become more sophisticated, they are unlikely to submit plans
to the Justice Department for preclearance that are overtly retrogressive under the "previous legally enacted plan" baseline. 2 0 The
real fight over district plans of the future is going to be not whether
they are more discriminatory than the current voting plan, but
whether they constitute discrimination in light of the ideal of equal
opportunity to elect a representative of one's choice. The courts
have steadfastly maintained, despite some dicta to the contrary, 24'

234. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (Shaw 1).
235. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (citing Show I, 509 U.S. at 656). One state justification that
could survive the application of the strict scrutiny test is the state's interest in remedying the
effects of past racial discrimination. Id.
236. Id. at 923 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)).
237. Id. (noting that such deference would be "surrendering to the Executive Branch [the
Courts] role in enforcing the constitutional limits on race-based official action").
238. See supra notes 198-207 and accompanying text (discussing Bossier Parish School
Board); J. Gerald Herbert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 431, 444
(2000) (noting that "[t]his result is plainly at odds with the prophylactic purposes of section 5,
which Congress intended to place the burdens of time and inertia on the shoulders of the perpetrators of discrimination rather than the victims").
239. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000).
240. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994) (observing that Congress recognized
this point when it adopted a 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act, stating that "since the
adoption of the Voting Rights Act, [some] jurisdictions have substantially moved from direct,
over[t] impediments to the right to vote to more sophisticated devices that dilute minority voting
strength").
241. See BossierParishSch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 33641 (holding that although dicta in both Beer
u. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1975), and Pleasant Grove t. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987),
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that this fight lies under a standard section 2 action for declaring a
plan unconstitutional and not in the section 5 preclearance determination by the Justice Department. Essentially, section 5 actions
were instituted to shift the burden of proving the discriminatory
nature of a voting plan from the wronged minority plaintiff to the
state legislature. 242 Therefore, by eliminating the non-retrogression
principle, states would be freed from the pointless exercise of seeking Justice Department preclearance for a plan that will not survive an equal protection challenge in the courts. In short, elimination of the non-retrogression principle as the criterion for preclearance would simply recognize what the Supreme Court has already
acknowledged: that the real battle over discriminatory reapportionment plans has shifted to section 2 claims.
3. Option 3: Use Proportionality As the Non-Retrogression Baseline
A state's proposed districting plan could be measured according to the change in the state's racial demographics, rather than by
the previously enacted legal voting plan. This approach is more
logical than the non-retrogression principle because nonretrogression does not take into account the fact that minority voters could voluntarily relocate from their current districts. Such a
redistribution of the minority population would make the creation
of geographically compact districts with a majority of minority voters an impossible task. Non-retrogression also does not plan for the
possibility that minority voters could actually decline as a percentage of the state's overall population. If a state that contains only
one majority-minority district faces a decrease in the percentage of
its minority residents, that state could be obligated to continue providing the minority population with that one district in order to
avoid backsliding under the non-retrogression principle. 24 3
At least one Supreme Court case has alluded to taking into
account the percentage of a jurisdiction's minority population when
measuring whether a proposed districting plan would grant a mi-

suggested that arguments addressing the constitutionality of voting plans could be addressed in
preclearance actions, the Court in Bossier ParishSchool Board wanted to reaffirm "that proceedings to preclear apportionment schemes and proceedings to consider the constitutionality of
apportionment schemes are entirely distinct").
242. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976).
243. But see Guinn et al., supra note 216, at 252 (asserting that "[i]f because of declining
population in the minority community, a political subdivision is simply unable to maintain the
previous benchmark, this physical impossibility will certainly not be considered retrogressive").
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nority equal voting opportunity. 244 The plaintiffs in Johnson v. DeGrandy alleged that a Florida state legislative apportionment
scheme violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 245 Minority voters claimed that the plan divided both blacks and Hispanics among
separate legislative districts when their populations were sufficiently concentrated and contiguous to have formed one or more
majority-minority districts.?6 The Supreme Court held that the
plan did not violate section 2 because the Florida plan provided for
majority-minority districts that were approximately proportional to
minorities' voting shares of the overall population. 247 The Court
noted that this concept of "proportionality" was distinct from that
prohibited under section 2, which disclaimed the idea that minority
candidates had a right under the statute to be elected in proportion
248
to their share of the voting population.
The Court declined, however, to adopt proportionality as definitive of whether a districting plan caused vote dilution. 24 9 The
main reason for rejecting proportionality as a "safe harbor" for jurisdictions seeking to implement new voting plans was that "the
rights of some minority voters under section 2 may be traded off
against the rights of other members of the same minority class."25 0
Another rationale cited against proportionality was that it would
sometimes perversely force a state to create a majority-minority
district, even where there was no need for race-conscious districting. 251 The Court's final reason for refusing to implement the proportionality standard was that section 2 commanded an investigation into discrimination "based on the totality of the circum252
stances."

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

DeGrandy,512 U.S. at 1014 n.11.
Id. at 997.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1014 n.11.
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1017 (1994).

250. Id. at 1019 (noting that "under the State's view, the most blatant racial gerrymandering
in half of a county's single-member districts would be irrelevant under section 2 if offset by political gerrymandering in the other half, so long as proportionality was the bottom line").
251. Id. at 1019-20. The Supreme Court observed that the Gingles factors for proving a section 2 action were created because "society's social and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate
majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity." Id. at 1020 (citing
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)). However, for other minority communities able
to unite with majority voters under common interests, majority.minority districts would be unnecessary and would insulate them from the realities of compromise that are at the heart of the
American political process. Id.
252. Id. at 1018.
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While some fear that proportionality would sacrifice the voting opportunities of some individuals in favor of others, all raceconscious districting forces state legislatures to make this bargain. 253 Whenever a state creates a majority-minority district, it
effectively limits the voting opportunities of the white voters that
reside in that district in order to increase the chances that minority
voters will be able to elect a candidate of their choice. The same is
true of the creation of majority districts-the chance that minority
voters will elect their preferred candidate is reduced when they do
not constitute the majority of the electorate. 2 54 Given that the
American form of government is a representative democracy, this is
a fundamental truth of the nature of American elections. Raceconscious districting creates a presumption based on a parliamentary system of proportional representation. By creating a number of
majority-minority districts to correspond with the state's percentage of minority voters, proportional representation assumes that
one minority candidate from one district adequately represents the
interests of the state's minority citizens. This rationale probably
explains why the Court cannot seem to articulate districting standards that make sense in light of the country's electoral system.
Proportionality gains a methodological advantage in that
states will not be forced to obsess over how to distribute new legislative districts created due to a state's population growth. Under
current retrogression principles, a plan created after the addition of
congressional seats would have to provide at least one majorityminority district. 255 When new congressional seats are awarded after the census, a state needs only to examine whether the minority
population has a corresponding percentage of majority-minority districts. For instance, when Georgia increases the number of legisla-

253. Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (commenting that "any theory of vote dilution
must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of minority voting strength that makes some
reference to the proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large") (quoting
Thornburg,478 U.S. at 84 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
254. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916-17 (1996) (Shaw I1). The Supreme Court held that "if a
[section] 2 violation is proved for a particular area, it flows from the fact that individuals in this
area 'have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect the representative of their choice.' The vote dilution injuries suffered by
these persons are not remedied by creating a safe majority-black district somewhere else in the
state." Id.
255. Karlan points out that one reason Georgia may have been required to form one majority-minority district out of ten in 1982 was that the respective populations of those ten districts
(546,000 each) was larger than the populations of the eleven districts granted after the 1990
census (496,000 each). Karlan, supra note 1, at 749. Blacks could have constituted a majority in
a single-member district under the 1990 district size. Id.

2001]

THREADING THE NEEDLE

2095

tive districts from eleven to thirteen, they can note that blacks constitute twenty-eight percent of the state's population, and draw
three majority-minority districts. Given that both proportionality
and other types of race-conscious districting share the drawback of
sacrificing individual rights for the sake of the group, proportionality seems the lesser of two evils.
It is a tenuous argument to say that proportionality would
require the creation of majority-minority districts in some areas
where it was not necessary. This assumes that the bulk of majorityminority districts are created after careful examination of whether
certain minority populations reside in areas so rife with ethnic conflict that their majority-white neighbors vote in a way that regularly defeats the minority choice candidate. This bloc voting by the
white majority is in fact the first of the three Gingles criteria necessary to prove a violation under section 2.25( The gerrymandered districts that appeared before the Court in the 1990s, however, revealed that minority populations were often connected by no more
than several hundred miles of a common interstate.2 It seems
unlikely that in the creation of a district separated by both geographic and economic interests that the legislature was able to tell
whether each of these numerous black communities was so politically at odds with its white neighbors that they were unable to
reach a viable political compromise. This premise, in turn, assumes
that in each district there is a candidate always identifiable as a
"minority" candidate. 258 If minorities were able to form voting coalitions with their geographically contiguous white neighbors, there
would be no need for race-conscious districting in the first place.
The Court's insistence that voting opportunity be measured
based on the "totality of the circumstances" also does not explain
why proportionality would be a less promising test than the current
non-retrogression standard. The DeGrandy Court emphasized the
totality of the circumstances approach because of the "demonstrated ingenuity of state and local governments in hobbling minor-

256. See supranote 201 (listing the Gingles factors).
257. See, e.g., Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 903.

258. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (Show 1). The Supreme Court flatly rejected
this assumption as a dangerous one in Show L See id. Race-conscious districting "reinforces the
perception that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education. economic
status, or the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and
will prefer the same candidates at the polls." Id. The Court also noted that race-conscious districting sends the message that representatives for majority-minority districts should "believe
that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their
constituency as a whole." Id. at 648.
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ity voting power." 259 As some of the cases discussed above have
noted, however, jurisdictions continue to implement districting
plans that are arguably either discriminatory towards minorities or
violate the equal protection rights of white voters-yet, these plans
still receive Justice Department preclearance under section 5 because they do not violate the non-retrogression principle.
Regardless of the DeGrandy Court's refusal to recognize proportionality as a safe harbor for a legislature's districting plan, the
Court did acknowledge that it could be used as one factor in determining whether a section 2 violation has occurred. 260 But, the
courts could also adopt proportionality as the main indicator of
whether a section 5 violation has occurred. A legislature's main dilemma is that by engaging in race-conscious districting, they expose
themselves to equal protection claims. If they fail to draw districts
by taking race into account, they become vulnerable to section 2
claims for discriminatory voting practices. The courts could agree,
however, that making the number of majority-minority districts
proportional to the percentage of minorities in the state's population would insulate the state from both an equal protection claim by
majority-white voters and preclearance rejection from the Justice
Department.
V. CONCLUSION

Those states that are forced to redraft congressional districting plans following the 2000 census face an imponderable dilemma.
Those jurisdictions currently subject to section 5 preclearance under the Voting Rights Act must balance the competing claims of
white voters concerned with racially gerrymandered districts drawn
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause with those of minority
citizens angered by reapportionment plans that seem to dilute their
potential voting power. Supreme Court decisions such as Shaw,
Miller, and Bossier ParishSchool Board obligate state legislatures
that propose districting plans following the 2000 census to reassess
their understanding of the non-retrogression principle. 26 1 This highwire act will demand that state legislatures understand that Shaw
prohibits using race as the overriding factor in crafting a new districting plan. 26 2 In addition, Bossier Parish School Board mandates

259. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994) (citing McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S.
236, 243-46 (1984)).
260. Id. at 1021.
261. Guinn et al., supra note 216, at 253.
262. Karlan, supra note 7, at 300-03.
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that the Justice Department preclear all non-retrogressive plans,
regardless of their discriminatory effects. However, a state must
constantly remember that such preclearance does not relieve it of
the obligation to ensure that such plans do not violate the equal
voting opportunity principles of section 2.
In light of these competing concerns, the most logical solution to the districting gridlock is the elimination of the nonretrogression principle from the section 5 preclearance requirement. Because preclearance does not insulate states from suits
based on section 2 violations, state legislatures should focus on creating reapportionment plans that relieve equal protection concerns.
By concentrating on satisfying criteria such as geographical compactness and respect for political subdivisions, states are more
likely to meet the districting standards the Court imposed in Shaw
and Miller. By adhering to these traditional districting principles,
state legislatures choose the lesser of two evils and remove themselves from the potentially paralyzing situation of fighting a districting war on two fronts.
Lindsay Ryan Errickson*

I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to Debbie Reule, Russ Miller, Matthew
Festa, and Rob McGuire for their thoughtful comments and thorough editing. Shay Zeemer deserves many thanks for meticulous attention to detail below the line. I would also like to express
my appreciation to my parents for their support of my educational endeavors, and finally to
Jason Hall, who expanded the scope of my aspirations.

